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The Pond Betwixt: Differences
in the US-EU Data Protection/Safe
Harbor Negotiation
By Richard J. Peltz-Steele
ince the adoption of the 1995 Data Protection
Directive (Directive)1 in the European Union,
data sharing between Europe and the United
States has been problematic. The Directive
made concrete in law and policy a conception
of privacy that had been diverging from its US
counterpart for decades. Nevertheless, in the first
decade of the 21st Century, a “safe harbor” and
related agreements (together, Safe Harbor)2 stitched
together a peace. Though at times the peace rested
uneasily, it bridged the Atlantic sufficiently to allow
commerce and innovation in technology and information to flourish largely unhindered by restrictions
on international data transfers.
But in the 2010s, the gulf between the continents has widened, and the bridge is stressed to a
possible breaking point. The Snowden revelations
of US government surveillance have exacerbated
tensions. Meanwhile ambitious efforts to overhaul the Directive for the new era of interconnected electronics and invasive technology has
proven contentious both within Europe and abroad.

S

Transnational business now watches intently as behemoth political powers struggle to refashion world privacy policy with far-reaching implications for human
rights and economic liberty around the world.
This article analyzes the differing perspectives
that animate US and EU conceptions of privacy in the
context of data protection. It begins by briefly reviewing the two continental approaches to data protection
and then explains how the two approaches arise in a
context of disparate cultural traditions with respect to
the role of law in society. In light of those disparities,
Continued on page 15
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protection in European law has come into being substantially in just the last half century.

the final discussion focuses on points of disparity that
are unlikely to be overcome in short-term negotiations
and advises each side on moving forward.

Constitutional Law
Privacy is safeguarded by ECHR Article 8, modeled in its 1950 original after the 1948 Universal
Declaration. The right appears in the dichotomous
expression typical of modern human rights guarantees, one provision broadly articulating the right,
followed by a second provision that authorizes public
limitation when “necessary in a democratic society.”
Whereas the Fourth Amendment in the United
States is a negative assertion designed to curtail state
power from infringement of individual liberty—
referencing a right that “shall not be violated”—the
European right of privacy is a positive declaration.
By the 1970s, the ECHR was showing its age.
To meet the challenges of the nascent information
age, the Council of Europe in 1980 adopted the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,6
known as “Convention 108” after its catalog number
in the European Treaty Series. Convention 108 introduced the notion of balance in the data protection
context, “[r]ecognising that it is necessary to reconcile the fundamental values of the respect for privacy
and the free flow of information between peoples.”7
The convention furthermore singled out “privacy”
as a “particular” motivation among its human-rights
aims,8 and the term appears three times in the convention’s substantive provisions.9
The right to privacy was folded into Article 7
of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, (Charter)10 made binding on the
European Union through the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon,11
effective 2009. The Charter does not expressly limit
rights by public necessity in the old dichotomous
style, but incorporates permissible limitations in
national law by reference to the source rights and
responsibilities as articulated in the ECHR.12
Critically, the Charter in its Article 8
“recognize[d] the right to the protection of personal
data as a new fundamental right, distinct from the
[article 7] right to respect for private and family
life, home and communications.”13 Accordingly the
European Commission regards data protection as a
member of the “third generation” of fundamental
rights alongside governmental transparency and “bioethics guarantees,” the latter also privacy inspired.14

T WO VA N TAG E S
International politics and economics being what
they are, privacy law and policy in the United States
and Europe reverberate throughout the world. To be
sure, US and European conceptions of privacy emerge
in a Western legal tradition that is far from universal.
Viewed from a truly global cultural perspective, the
trans-Atlantic divergence is not so broad. But US and
EU approaches today vie not only for north Atlantic
dominance, but as models for the world. So the study
of this divergence, and how it emerged from a shared
cultural heritage, merits scrutiny.
COMMON FONT
Underpinning contemporary data protection regulation is the normative value that both US and EU
societies place on personal privacy. Both cultures attribute modern privacy to the famous Warren-Brandeis
article in 1890, outlining a “right to be let alone.” 3 But
decades passed before the impact of the article was felt.
Notwithstanding the dramatic achievement of women’s suffrage, human rights in the early 20th Century
were marred by the two World Wars and failure of the
League of Nations. After World War II, privacy came
into its own. The word appeared explicitly in Article
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,4
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. With the
drafting in 1950 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR),5 however, the United States
and Europe committed to divergent paths.
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
IN EUROPE
Both privacy and data protection are today
part of the fundamental rights system of Europe,
a component of the amalgamated constitution of
the European Union. Both are part of the legislative and regulatory state at the national and federal
levels. This remarkable ubiquity of privacy and data

15
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Article 8 has three provisions. The first broadly proclaims “the right to the protection of personal data.”
The second provision concerns data processing. First
it requires that “data … be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid
down by law.” Second it proclaims a right of access
to data and a right to rectification of error. The third
provision requires that data protection compliance
be controlled by “an independent authority,” that is,
by an entity at arm’s length from the conventional
machinery of each national government.
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•
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Law and Regulation
Those particular data protection concepts
enshrined in the 2000 Charter—limited and consensual processing, access and rectification, and supervisory independence—were by then known principles
of the European data protection regime—established
by the 1995 Directive.15
The Directive has been well summarized in the
literature.16 It is broad in scope. The “personal data”
that triggers regulation is “any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly,” even by a reference
number or descriptive characteristic.17 Data “processing” is “any operation or set of operations which is
performed upon personal data,” including collection,
transmission, and destruction.18 Regulated data “controllers” and “processors” include any persons or entities responsible for data processing, public or private.19
Any data processing must be “legitimate,” and
legitimacy is dictated by disjunctive criteria, which
include subject consent, legal obligation, vital interests of the subject, public interest, and “legitimate
interests” not contravened by fundamental rights.20 In
broad strokes, the Directive articulated a series of fair
information practices (FIPs) that have become well
recognized norms, namely:
•

•

16

“data minimization,”21 meaning that data controllers should collect and retain data only as
befits the purpose of its use;22
notice, access, and correction: all provisions in
the later vein of Charter article 8(2), regarding
the obligation of data controllers to inform data
subjects about the collection and processing
of their data, affording opportunity for access

•
•
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to that data and correction, or rectification, of
errors;23
transparency of data processing,24 especially with
regard to the logic behind automated data processing, a safeguard that means in part to forestall
de facto discrimination resulting from the use of
analytics;25
consent of data subjects to the processing of their
data, “freely given[,] specific[,] and informed”;26
“sensitive data”27 classifications, such as medical
and financial, and that trigger a higher level of
protection;28
security, to protect data against misuse, loss, and
theft;29
enforcement of data protection law through
national supervisory bodies;30 and
independence of the national supervisory
bodies.31

As a “directive” in European law, the data protection law must be implemented at the national
level. As a piece of federal legislation, the Directive
is subject to definitive interpretation by the European
Court of Justice. Furthermore, the Directive in its
article 29 constitutes a “Working Party,” comprising
national data protection supervisors and representatives of European Community bodies and of the
European Commission.
The Directive contains a number of important limitations. Data processing limitations pertain
only within the scope of European Community law,
though data transfers onward to third countries are
permissible only if “adequate” data safeguards are in
place on the receiving end.32 The Directive exempts
from its scope state data processing for purposes of
national security and criminal law enforcement.33
“[A] natural person in the course of a purely personal
or household activity” also is exempt.34
Proposed Regulation
Now 20 years old, the Directive is dated. The
Internet was far from ubiquitous in 1995, and mass
data processing was the occupation of a manageable
range of public and private actors. Technological
advancements have brought daily life within the
ambit of the Directive, and globalization in commerce
has tested the reach of the Directive. Meanwhile the
passage of time has resulted in increasing variegation
in the interpretation, application, and enforcement of
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data protection across Europe. The sum of these pressures was a movement in the European Parliament
to overhaul and supersede the Directive with a
new General Data Protection Regulation (Proposed
Regulation).
The European Commission published a draft
text for the Proposed Regulation in January 2012.35
The ambitious project has spurred quarrels within
Europe—even a competing draft from the European
Parliament36—and drawn fire from abroad, namely
media and business interests in the United States.
At the time of this writing in spring 2015, adoption
seems more likely in 2016 than in 2015, with an effective date two or three years later.
The Proposed Regulation also has been explicated
in the literature.37 As a regulation rather than a directive, it will be a self-executing law among EU member
states, not contingent on the enactment of domestic
legislation. In short, the Proposed Regulation will
beef up fair information practices. Consent standards
are more demanding, transparency requirements are
more explicit, and liability and sanctions for noncompliance are more severe. Supervision and enforcement are toughened, and consistency enhanced, with
the creation of a European Data Protection Board,
composed of national data protection supervisors.
Critically, the Proposed Regulation extends its
territorial reach outside the European Community,
to any entity within the reach of EU jurisdiction
that “offers goods or services to … data subjects in the
Union” or “monitors their behavior.”38 The Proposed
Regulation thus sweeps in the lot of multinational
companies that do business with EU citizens, regardless of a company’s geographic location. That expansion is what has drawn the attention, and in some
cases the ire, of US interests.

PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
It comes as a surprise to the casual observer of
US law that there is in the United States any kind
of systematic protection for data privacy. Indeed,
“systematic” is a generous word. But Warren-Brandeis
privacy did originate in the United States, and the
Internet era has seen a burgeoning complex of law
and regulation in privacy, however much lacking in
unifying strategy.

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N E T L AW

Constitutional Law
The lack of explicit mention of privacy in the US
Bill of Rights has slowed but not stopped the development of privacy as a constitutional concept. But two
features of US constitutional design—federalism and
negative civil rights—have important implications
for how privacy is and may be developed in US law.
First, the US Constitution created a rigid federal
structure, bolstered by the Tenth Amendment and
limited by the Reconstruction Amendments. The
observance of vertical separation of powers has been
a hallmark of the conservative political platform and
conservative constitutional jurisprudence since the
civil rights era—witness the debate over universal
healthcare in federal law. As a result, the federal government must navigate the complexities of its limited
powers to erect a nationwide level floor of statutory
and regulatory privacy protection.
Second, the Bill of Rights, as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment, is a negative
legal instrument, designed to shield people against
the power of government.39 As a result, US constitutional privacy law is powerfully influenced by the
state action doctrine. Constitutional manifestations
of privacy in the United States are not well equipped
to frame a modern system of data protection that
tackles challenges in the public and private sectors
alike.
At least when state action is implicated, privacy
has manifested as a constitutional value in three
dimensions: (1) the right to personal autonomy, (2) the
right to be let alone, and (3) the right to informational privacy.
The first vein of constitutional privacy, personal
autonomy, comes closest to the broad European conception of privacy as a basic dignitary interest. This
is the right of privacy that operates in the abortion
cases, in essence affording a woman pre-viability
access to abortion services subject to state constraints
that do not unduly burden the right.40 Consequently,
autonomy-privacy has been swept up in the vitriol of
the abortion controversy. The bitter political, social,
and jurisprudential divides cast a long shadow over
every discussion of privacy as a constitutional concept. Autonomy-privacy is not so limited, though,
and has a broad range of potential application, especially in medical decisionmaking. Autonomy-privacy
has been at stake in the US Supreme Court’s “right
to die” cases, one finding a constitutional right to
17
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refuse unwanted treatment,41 and another rejecting a
constitutional right to assisted suicide.42
The second vein of constitutional privacy, the right
to be let alone, or to seclusion, traces its lineage directly
to the 1791 Bill of Rights. In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the controlling concept in defining the scope
of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
has been the “reasonable expectation of privacy.”43
This test is criticized today as incompatible with a
fundamental, so undiminishable, right.44 Reasonable
expectation, a floating norm, necessarily diminishes
in the panopticon of the online world.45 Making matters worse, the reasonable expectation of privacy is
limited dramatically by the third-party doctrine, which
holds that privacy is forfeit when information is voluntarily submitted to a third party, such as a bank or
communication service provider.46 This stark division
between information secret because it is secreted, and
information not secret because it is disclosed—termed
“the secrecy paradigm” by Professor Daniel Solove47—
persists as a norm in US privacy law. But what might
at one time have accorded with a societal sense of reasonableness no longer does—as evidenced by popular
objection to the dragnet collection of communication
metadata by the US intelligence service.
The third vein of constitutional privacy, the right
to informational privacy, has been assumed arguendo
by the US Supreme Court on three occasions, but
remains a largely uncharted sea. In all three cases, the
Court concluded that public access to personal information was sufficiently justified or constrained to
surmount the objections of data subjects. In Whalen v.
Roe,48 the Court rejected a challenge, based on
informational privacy and autonomy-privacy, to a
New York criminal enforcement system that monitored drug prescriptions. In Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services,49 the Court determined that the
statutory-regulatory framework for reviewing and
preserving executive records adequately protected the
informational privacy interests of former President
Nixon. More recently, in NASA v. Nelson,50 the
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to security
background checks on space-agency contractors.
Statute and Common Law
While lacking a comprehensive privacy law,
the US Congress has enacted a number of sectorspecific privacy laws, usually using the Commerce
Clause51 as the source of federal legislative authority.
18
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These statutes include the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) (1970),52 the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) (1974),53 the federal Privacy
Act (1974),54 the Video Privacy Protection Act
(VPPA) (1988),55 the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (1996),56 and the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
(1998).57
Each law defines its own scope in accordance
with the problem it anticipates, and each its oversight or enforcement mechanism, invariably public
rather than private. For example, FERPA governs
public and private educational institutions receiving
public funds (virtually all of them) with respect to
student data, and HIPAA governs defined healthcare providers with respect to patient data. FERPA
is enforced by the Department of Education58 with
regulated entities’ funding in jeopardy (though no
de-funding has ever occurred).59 HIPAA is enforced
by the Department of Health and Human Services60
and threatens heavy civil fines as well as criminal
jeopardy.61 Neither authorizes private enforcement.
More recently, strident legal means of data protection have emerged in three more venues: (1) data
breach notification laws, (2) consumer protection
law, and (3) common law tort. Forty-seven states,
Washington, DC, and three territories now have data
breach notification laws.62 They vary widely in their
particulars; 14 states, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico,
and the US Virgin Islands authorize a private cause
of action.63 A key law exists too at the federal level,
limited to the finance sector: the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, formally known as the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999.64 As hacking and data
breaches continue to make headlines, the adoption of
a cross-sector federal law seems inevitable.65
Second, data protection has emerged in consumer protection law. Born with the US regulatory state in the early 20th Century, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has characteristically broad
authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act to regulate
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce.”66 Accordingly, the FTC has
deployed its authority in furtherance of the simple
proposition that a company must do what it says it
does. So if a company says that it maintains data
security, that statement becomes a promise to the
consumer, enforceable by the FTC. The scope of
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that enforcement authority is now being tested in
the Third Circuit.67 Target of an FTC enforcement
suit, Wyndham Worldwide Corp., a global hotelier,
is arguing that the FTC lacks statutory authority to
bind commercial entities to reasonable data security
standards.68
A third and very recent avenue of data protection
is now emerging in common law tort. Despite the lack
of a private cause of action in sector-specific privacy
statutes, some victims of data security breaches have
found traction in common law negligence, predicated
on the violation of privacy law.69 A negligence per se
theory fits well with HIPAA-designed classes of plaintiff, hazard, and harm, and the Connecticut Supreme
Court found HIPAA not preemptive.70

devices per 12 months, or employing fewer than six
persons, except where sensitive data are concerned.77
Substantial civil penalties attend violation of data
protection standards, up to $35,000 per day, or $5,000
per consumer, to a maximum of $25 million.78
The CPBRA drives its FIPs with 11 “context”
factors, including the scope of the regulated entity’s
interaction with the data subject, the nature of the
regulated entity’s business in goods or services, foreseeability and customary business practices, the age
and sophistication of the data subject, and security
measures employed by the regulated entity.79 The FIPs
themselves include:

Proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act
In late February 2015, the White House published a discussion draft of a bill, the Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights Act (CPBRA).71 The draft
drew together ideas that had been fomenting for
some time. Consumer bills of rights already have been
floated on Capitol Hill, and the White House language closely tracks ideas published two years earlier
in an executive white paper.72 Politics being what it
is in Washington in the last two years of the Obama
Administration, the CPBRA probably will not get
traction in this Congress. But with keen bipartisan
interest in consumer protection, and even the support of industry seeking to reduce costs through harmonization in domestic and international regulatory
compliance, the CPBRA might prove influential in
the eventual development of cross-sector privacy
legislation in the United States.
The CPBRA would maintain federal focus on
consumer privacy in commercial transactions, so the
law is not cross-sectoral in every respect. The hook
for federal jurisdiction is the Commerce Clause.73
Enforcement authority remains with the FTC and
exclusively public,74 though state attorneys general are authorized to bring enforcement actions in
the absence of FTC action.75 Protected information relates to consumer identity, including names,
financial account identifiers, and communication
identifiers, such as an online user’s Internet Protocol
address.76 The CPBRA broadly defines “covered
entities” by excluding governments, individuals acting non-commercially, and small businesses—data
processing from fewer than 10,000 individuals or

•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•

data minimization in collection, retention, and
use;80
notice requirements;81
reasonable control over data in proportion to the
risks in event of compromise;82
reasonable use of data in light of context;83
revocable consent;84
reasonable access, correction or destruction,
and accuracy;85
deletion, destruction, or de-identification of
data upon expiry of the processor’s purpose;86 and
reasonable security and accountability measures
to protect data.87

Data processing that is “not reasonable” still may be
permitted if a regulated entity conducts an appropriate privacy risk analysis,88 and a regulated entity may
apply to the FTC for pre-approval of a code of practice as a safe harbor.89
The correction and accuracy provisions exempt
information obtained from government sources, so
providing a sort of fair-reporting privilege.90 Also
the CPBRA defers repeatedly—in a global provision
and in specific limitations on duties—to the First
Amendment rights of regulated entities.91 That latter
qualification might cut deeply into the obligations
the law would impose, insofar as a commercial entity
has a First Amendment right to republish lawfully
obtained truthful information.92
Reaction to the White House draft was swift
and critical from both sides (perhaps a good sign). A
representative of a consumer-protection organization
declared the bill too “full of loopholes” to afford consumers “meaningful control of their data.”93 Rep. Ed
Markey (D-MA) called for a statutory reform offering
19
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“uniform and legally enforceable rules” rather than
flexible factors.94 At the same time, an advocate for
the advertising industry criticized the draft bill as “an
attempt to prevent theoretical harms,” “sure to put a
deep chill” on information innovation.95

THE POND BETWIXT
TECTONIC DIFFERENTIAL
Obviously substantial differences separate EU
and US privacy law.96 The former is comprehensive,
the latter sectoral. Differences derive from a disparity between each continent’s foundational thinking
about law and society, especially with respect to civil
rights. And the differences play out in each continent’s capacity and willingness to legislate in privacy
and data protection.97
Europe embraces a social-democratic form of
government. Fundamental rights are dynamic and
evolving. Government has an affirmative duty to the
public to foster this evolution through the positive
operation of law, bolstering and expanding individual
autonomy. Law advances policy choices that are
distributive, or allocative, of societal resources, in
accordance with the normative choices of democratic
bodies. Individuals owe a duty to one another in an
interdependent system of social responsibility.
The United States embraces a libertarian model
of government. Fundamental rights derive from a
relatively static Constitution. Rights may be adapted
through interpretive jurisprudence, if not through
strict originalism and textual amendment, but living constitutionalism or re-constitutionalism is disfavored. Government is best that governs least, so
the operation of law is largely negative, to ensure
that social and economic liberties are protected from
interference. Law functions primarily in a corrective
capacity, reacting to wrongs by re-leveling the playing field. Individual autonomy flourishes on liberty,
rendering persons responsible for their own choices,
whether successful or unsuccessful.
The EU approach to data protection is comprehensive, or omnibus. The Data Protection Directive
spans strata of geography, society, and subject matter;
the Proposed Regulation will only deepen continental commitment to the confederal system. The system
draws its authority initially from fundamental rights
20
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as articulated in international human rights instruments and constituting documents. That higher
law is then given effect through supranational and
national legislation and administrative regulation.
Enforcement occurs at all levels from supranational
courts to national courts to administrative process.
Individuals are entitled to seek redress.
The US approach to data protection is sectoral,
or ad hoc. Sectoral vectors vary and include dual
sovereignty, geographic jurisdiction, scope of regulated industry, and data subject matter. The system
has a limited constitutional foundation, especially as
against regulated entities in the private sector, and
draws its authority principally from sectoral statutes
and their regulations. These laws favor paradigms
of property and contract, rather than human rights.
The statutory framework may be complemented by
evolving common law. Enforcement varies with the
sectoral scope of the legal device. But enforcement
is largely a public undertaking with limited if any
redress for individuals.
Macro differences in approach play out in countless ways in the micro systems of data protection. The
United States obsession with economic liberty explains
the persistent focus on commercial relationships from
2000 Safe Harbor to the 2015 Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights Act. Relationships among persons and commercial actors in the United States are matters of contract
and property. The secrecy paradigm arises from the
notion of personal data as property. At common law, a
person has no persistent legal interest in property that
is sold or given away. Moreover, a constitutional right
of republication weighs heavily against regulation of
information disclosure or transfer. Public actors can
be regulated only by the negative operation of constitutional or statutory law. A data processor operates
on a presumption of permissibility, subject to highly
constrained limitations.
In contrast, Europe’s romantic attraction to fundamental rights frames data protection in a rights paradigm. Personal dignity and autonomy are dictated by
how information presents one’s identity to the world.
Accordingly, a person’s legal interests persist in information as it flows downstream from one pair of hands
to the next. The individual retains rights to direct and
control the use of that information, and even to recall it
from the marketplace. Positive articulations of human
rights imbue government not only with the power to
protect those persistent legal rights in information,
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but a duty to effect informational rights as against the
interests of other actors. Informational rights moreover
must be balanced with, and do not yield to, competing
rights, such as freedom of expression in republication.
Public and private actors alike are bound by the positive operation of law to advance fundamental rights. A
data processor operates only with legal authorization,
against a background of presumed prohibition.

SAFE HARBOR AND STORMY WEATHER
The patchwork of data protection law in the
United States is far from “adequate” to ensure data
protection to the standards of the EU Directive.
Accordingly, the European Union and United States
negotiated a fix in the 2000 Safe Harbor Agreement.98
To ensure the integrity of data transferred from
Directive nations onward to the United States,
receiving entities could pledge their allegiance to an
agreed on series of principles, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

clear notice of data collection, processing, and
transfer;
data subject choice to opt out (or to opt in when
sensitive information is concerned);
subsequent data transfer limited by comparable
safeguards;
reasonable security to protect data;
relevance of data processing to purpose of
collection;
data subject access to correct, amend, or delete
data, subject to proportionality of the burden on
another’s rights;
enforcement through complaint, dispute resolution process, and sufficient sanction.99

The mechanism to give force of law to the Safe
Harbor Agreement is the broad authority of FTC Act
Section 5.100 A commercial actor must self-certify its
compliance to the FTC, and contravention of that
representation constitutes an unfair or deceptive
trade practice.101
Safe Harbor was complemented, if not outstripped, by two other mechanisms for Directive
compliance in the United States, model contractual
clauses and binding corporate rules. The European
Commission approved model contractual clauses in
2001 and 2004.102 A party in Europe is able to effect

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N E T L AW

a Directive-sanctioned data transfer with a party in
the United States by including approved language in
a contract governing the transfer.103 The Article 29
Working Party has approved binding corporate rules
in various versions.104 A multinational corporation
may adopt binding corporate rules to effect Directivesanctioned data transfers between EU and US business
components bound by the same rules.105 Binding corporate rules receive explicit sanction in the Proposed
Regulation.106 Model contractual clauses and binding corporate rules both are made enforceable in the
United States through the FTC Act.
Safe Harbor has not been a cure-all. The United
States and Europe tussled for years over the US security demand that incoming airliners surrender passenger manifests.107 But Safe Harbor maintained an
uneasy peace for more than a decade. Then European
efforts to update data protection law propelled Safe
Harbor into renegotiation in 2011.108 That negotiation was shocked in 2013 by the Snowden revelations
of US surveillance practices, causing the European
Parliament and national political leaders to scrutinize
the renegotiation and raise objections to its singular
focus on the private sector.109
Nevertheless, negotiators in 2014 announced substantial agreement on revamping Safe Harbor, even
while European squabbles persist internally over the
Proposed Regulation. Safe Harbor is expected to continue without dramatic change, i.e., without requiring a
US consumer privacy bill of rights, or more—save one
sticking point. EU leaders desire an individual right
of EU citizens to judicial redress in the United States
for violations of Safe Harbor commitments, analogous
to the right of any person in the European Union dissatisfied with an outcome in a national data protection
authority to take the case to court in that nation.110
The 2000 agreement had solved the enforcement problem with an administrative dispute resolution process
only within the FTC. A private cause of action in the
third branch of government would introduce a horse of
a different color, no less for EU complainants than for
the domestic aggrieved. Even the White House’s draft
CPBRA stops short of private enforcement.

B R I D G E OV E R T R O U B L E D WAT E R
The competing Atlantic perspectives on data
protection must be reconciled to a functional extent.
21
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The difference between the two sides, from a global
perspective, is too small to countenance an artificial,
legal blockage of the naturally and rapidly increasing
fluidity of global exchange in commerce, information, and ideas. In previous writing, I posited that
the two systems of privacy and data protection are
farther along on a road to convergence than conventional wisdom suggests.111 But the systems will not
harmonize in just the next few years. Some fix of Safe
Harbor is needed that both sides can abide.112
Following are salient points of difference over
data protection that derive from the disparity in legal
cultures across the Atlantic. On these points, wisdom
counsels agreement to disagree. But the continuation of Safe Harbor requires that these disparities be
bridged at least temporarily while the slow but inexorable process of cultural convergence marches on.

US STATE ACTION DOCTRINE VERSUS
EU PUBLIC/PRIVATE REGULATION
The state action doctrine and negative operation
of the Bill of Rights in the United States continue to
mark a bright line in regulation between public and
private regulated entities. In the European Union,
public and private actors merge as regulated entities
under the same data protection rules. The independence principle requires national data protection
authorities to work at arm’s length from government
precisely to ensure non-partisan oversight of the
public sector. From a European vantage, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) is a comfortably nonpartisan overseer of the private sector. But Europe
evinced frustration, especially after the Snowden
revelations, that Department of Commerce authority
in data transfer negotiation stopped short of public
sector data management. From the outsider’s perspective, trusting the Department of Defense to protect
personal privacy from public intrusion seems a case
of the fox and the henhouse. Worse, this fox bears a
sated grin from feasting on cross-border email.
The European perspective here has merit, but
only to a point. The dichotomy of state action in the
United States is anachronistic. From the perspective of a data subject, privacy is privacy; the secrecy
paradigm has merit. The privacy of a library record
or a prescription record does not turn on the identity
of the snoop. Invasion of privacy injures personal
22
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dignity regardless of whether the invader carries
official credentials. Moreover, the threat is not dissimilar. The same analytics a retailer uses to generate
a customized coupon for cold medicine may be used
to track the spread of virus, or to interdict methamphetamine production. Moreover, the same data may
be used in the private sector to effect invidious price
discrimination113 or in the public sector to effect discrimination in law enforcement.
So if data protection is the logical extension of
privacy rights, the United States cannot justify bearing
down on the private sector while handling the public
sector with kid gloves. Barring application of the odd
sectoral statute, such as the Privacy Protection Act
of 1980, which protects journalists,114 government
intelligence gathering and criminal investigation are
limited principally by the Fourth Amendment. The
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, along
with its gaping non sequitur, the third-party doctrine,
is far out of step with contemporary technology.
For example, police are now employing “stingray”
devices—formerly the province of the super-spy—to
mass-capture cell phone data in search of a target.
Also the National Security Administration (NSA),
reasonably under present law, contends that the
mass collection of cell phone and email metadata
is permissible under the third-party doctrine. In a
speech at Northeastern University Law School in
March 2015, Kade Crawford of the Massachusetts
ACLU called for legislative solutions.115 She pointed
out that the Fourth Amendment merely offers a
constitutional floor to protect civil liberties, and
the judicial process is far too slow to respond to new
technological threats while people’s liberty hangs in
the balance. Americans should demand legislation
to protect civil liberties above the floor, Crawford
asserted.
Beyond law enforcement, the Privacy Act of
1974 holds federal government agencies at least to
standards that modestly resemble the contemporary
fair information practices of Safe Harbor and the
European Directive.116 But the Privacy Act is limited
in scope and qualitatively far less stringent. It requires
notice that record systems are maintained, but notice
means only publication in the Federal Register.117 The
Privacy Act prohibits disclosure without consent, but
its host of exemptions falls shy of the purpose-driven
constraints of the Directive.118 The Privacy Act
affords data subjects rights of access and correction,
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though not withdrawal or erasure,119 and the act vests
rights only in citizens and permanent residents.120
But when European arguments turn to Snowden,
they smack of disingenuity. The Directive itself
exempts national security within Europe.121 The
exemption sensibly accommodates national sovereignty in the confederal system and pays faint but
apt allegiance to the concept of three pillars in
European governance, distinguishing civil, criminal,
and military affairs.122 Foreign intelligence gathering and homeland security in the United States also
are rightly distinguished from public record management. Moreover, it strains credulity to imagine
that European security officials are not engaged in
their own vigorous intelligence gathering. Der Spiegel
reported that the NSA shared its questionably gotten gains with the German intelligence service.123
My more erudite colleague Professor David Bender
imagined an aid to German Chancellor Angela
Merkel tapping her on the shoulder after a speech
of US-aimed outrage to politely mention Germany’s
reliance on the same methods.124 Whatever national
security policy is or should be among the north
Atlantic nations, the NSA’s most relevant sin might
be simply getting caught with its hands in the cookie
jar. The contemporary problem of the surveillance
state is a problem, and an important one, but it lies
well beyond the purview of data transfer policy.
Europe in the end will have to accept the primacy of the public-private distinction in US law and
policy. No matter how similar the threat to privacy in
each sector, the United States is far from recognizing
a merger of public and private for the purpose of data
protection regulation. Matters of national security
should be relegated, such as the Passenger Name
Records Agreement, beyond safe harbor.
At the same time, the United States should
look hard at the Privacy Act. Its dated standards,
only modestly amended since 1974, hardly suffice
to protect personal privacy in the information age.
In demonstrating respect for the dignity of the individual, government should set the example for private
business, not trail behind. Even pending legislative
action, the US executive has ample latitude in its
oversight of federal record management to improve
information practices with respect to personal privacy. Negotiation over data transfer is an opportunity
to learn from comparativism and to improve efficiency and responsiveness in the federal bureaucracy.
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The United States also should look hard at the
inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment to constrain
criminal law enforcement. A bright line does not
always separate domestic crime from terroristic threats
to national security. But the line shines well enough
sometimes, as where the federal preoccupation with
drug crime is concerned. Rather than setting a poor
example for the states, such as with national security letters that exploit the third-party doctrine, the
federal government should lead the way in raising
the bar above the Fourth Amendment floor. Again,
negotiation over data transfer offers an opportunity to
learn from comparative example. And again, the US
executive has room to maneuver short of legislation.
Attorneys General have ample power to regulate, and
have regulated, investigatory practices in federal law
enforcement.

US DUAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS
EU CONFEDERATION
Dual sovereignty under the US Constitution still
places sharp limits on the power of the federal government. Especially in the fluid world of contemporary
commerce and communication, the brilliance of the
50 state laboratories125 often is lost on foreign entities, public and private alike, when legal agreements
and commercial practices have to adhere simultaneously to the more than 50 standards of US state and
territorial governments. But the debated wisdom of
continuing this arrangement is immaterial; for better
and for worse, it is the constitutional design that will
not soon change.
In the European Union, the Directive maintains
a confederal separation of powers by vesting data
protection authority at the national level.126 The
Proposed Regulation will increase the role of the
federal government in the creation of a European
Data Protection Board, to enhance consistency across
nations. But overall the Proposed Regulation maintains the confederal model of data protection authority. Under the Treaty of Lisbon and the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),127
the Proposed Regulation, assuming adoption by the
European Council, is within the shared competencies of the European Union and member states,128
so is consistent with the unique design of vertically
separated powers in the European Union. The shared
23
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competence authorizes both social and economic
legislation, so there is no distinction in the Directive
or the Proposed Regulation between commercial and
non-commercial activity. The Directive reaches individuals, if through national data protection authorities, without federalism objections.
Owing in large measure to US federalism, the US
legal system is highly resistant to exported EU privacy
norms, a source of frustration for EU policy-makers.
In the US division of governmental competencies,
direct federal power over state governments is nearly
restricted to the carrot-and-stick approach. So for the
federal government to regulate public sector data protection at the state level would require either a substantial infusion of money or a political willingness
to highly rate data protection as prerequisite to some
other pot of federal gold—unlikely. With respect to
criminal law enforcement, there might be room for
Congress to enforce the Fourth Amendment through
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, and the possibility should not be ruled out, especially where equal
protection against discrimination is concerned. But
the negative operation of the Fourth Amendment
still presents an obstacle to positive legislation.
Insofar as data protection in the private sector is
predicated on personal privacy, and privacy is understood in the Warren-Brandeis vein, the states possess
the broadest authority to regulate. Accordingly, invasion of privacy has developed in state tort law. Even
the quasi-intellectual property theory of post mortem
misappropriation of likeness has been a creation of
state statute.129 Absent recognizable civil rights violation, federal action in the sphere of tort, contract, or
property runs against the constitutional grain.
If anything like European shared competence over
data protection is to be found in the United States,
it is in the regulation of commerce. The broad reach
of the Commerce Clause130—essentially “substantial
effect” doctrine131 plus the Wickard multiplier132—
allows the federal hand to reach into what otherwise
seems to be intrastate commerce. Meanwhile the
states have principal regulatory authority over commerce within their borders. As nearly any commercial
activity can be said to affect interstate commerce in
today’s interconnected world, a broad gray zone of
concurrent competence lies between the hypothetically purely household activity, on the one side, and
federal preemption133 and the dormant Commerce
Clause,134 on the other. It is no surprise, then, that
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state experimentation gave rise to the wave of data
breach notification laws, inventing a concept that
Europe itself has borrowed.135 Compliance with 47
such laws might vex corporate counsel, but the
advent of breach notification laws evidences the state
laboratories working as they should.
US federal competence in data transfer negotiation therefore necessarily is limited and finds its most
robust expression in the commercial area. Following
the Commerce Clause hook, commercial actors are
the regulated entities, and the FTC is the logical
enforcement authority. The draft CPBRA would
bolster the vertical separation of powers by excluding non-commercial individuals and small, therefore
more likely intra-state, commercial actors from the
scope of regulated entities. The definition of personally identifying information in the draft act similarly
maintains focus on the commercial context.
It is unrealistic for Europe to expect that federal
data protection in the United States would reach
beyond the scope of interstate commerce. If not
uniformly, the states have demonstrated a willingness to legislate data protection even more vigorously
than the federal government. Massachusetts136 and
California137 have advanced systems. State experiments in time may percolate to become a more
comprehensive federal regulation of commerce. It is
moreover disingenuous for Europe to feign ignorance
of, or purport disdain for, the federalist competence
spheres in the United States. Europe itself is a quasifederal system with spheres of competence articulated
in the TFEU.138 In fact, customs, market competition,
monetary policy, and foreign commerce are set out as
areas of exclusive federal competence.139 So Europe
well understands the theory of federalism expressed
through the Commerce Clause.
At the same time, the United States should
look more carefully at the civil rights implications
of inadequate data protection. Galvanized by the
war on terror, federal law enforcement and even
military authorities have been eager to beef up the
capacities of state and local law enforcement with
respect to both brute-force gear and technological
gadgetry. Little thought has been given to the implications for civil liberties, whether with respect to
individuals’ physical safety or with respect to personal dignity. The Snowden revelations and recent
cases of high technology surveillance by local law
enforcement from thermal imaging140 to GPS141 to
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tower dumps and stingrays142 are a wake-up call.
Recent media attention to police conduct from the
killing in Ferguson, Missouri, to the apparent abuse
of a University of Virginia student, in the news at
the time of this writing143 point to the dangers of an
over-empowered public sector and disparately adverse
impact on disadvantaged persons, if not outright
discrimination.
In Europe, data protection is working against
the tendency of government in the age of terrorism
to erect a surveillance state in the name of public
security. The relative isolation and sheer size of the
United States have tended to forestall the problem of
the surveillance state, 9/11 notwithstanding. But the
US federal government should be prepared to exercise its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect civil rights, recognizing that appropriate data
management in both public and private sectors is part
of that picture. Negotiation over data transfer is an
opportunity, again, to learn from comparativism, and
to inspire the federal government to lead the states,
rather than trailing behind.

US CONTRACT/PROPERTY PARADIGM
VERSUS EU RIGHTS PARADIGM
As explained above, the dominating ethic of
personal responsibility in the cultural tradition of US
law and policy tends to frame privacy in a paradigm
of contract and property. In this paradigm, individuals
act affirmatively, to bargain for and protect their own
interests. The role of government is to stay out of the
way, and the role of law is to make sure that it does. If
there is a place for law, it is as a corrective, or remediation, when agreements are broken. Accordingly,
personal information is a commodity, and personal
data may be sold, licensed, or given away. At the same
time, it is extremely difficult to remove and develop
data protection, as a subspecies of privacy, from the
contract/property paradigm by constitutionalizing it
as a fundamental right. Constitutional jurisprudence
is text-based and interpretive, so fundamental rights
tend to be defined statically.
In contrast, the dominating ethic of social responsibility in the cultural tradition of law and policy in
post-World War II Europe tends to frame privacy in a
paradigm of human rights. In this paradigm, individuals are entitled passively to some protection of their
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interests by the state and by their fellow citizens. The
role of government is to act affirmatively to ensure
the realization of human rights, and the role of law
is to give effect to rights in everyday life. Law acts
as a distributive, or allocative, force, organizing the
resources of society to maximize each individual’s
potential. Accordingly, personal information is an
expression of identity, and personal data may be
shared, but remains an aspect of personhood, under
the control of the originator. Data protection is
recognized as a fundamental right, a subspecies of privacy, in the constituting instruments of the European
Union. Constitutional jurisprudence is interpretive,
but adaptive and evolving, so fundamental rights may
grow dynamically.
The most evident manifestation of this disparity
in approach to data protection is in each continent’s
permissiveness of an individual’s control over downstream use and transfer of personal information. In
the United States, downstream control is a nearly
foreign concept, as unlikely as a former homeowner
returning to the home to object to the new owner’s
décor. Personal data are an alienable commodity.
In the European Union, however, an individual’s
surrender of personal information for unrestrained
downstream use is no more legally permissible than
surrendering one’s liberty to involuntary servitude.
Personal data are integral to individual identity and
cannot be alienated.
This disparity is perhaps the most toxic in transAtlantic negotiation, because it derives from the
very identity of each culture. To American eyes, the
European system seems the pandering of a nanny state
determined to interject behemoth government into
every human interaction to ensure that no sloth goes
unrewarded, that no human endeavor goes unpunished, and that mankind’s natural Darwinist drive to
improve the human condition through productive
achievement is utterly derailed. To European eyes, the
US system seems a hopeless cult of delusional majoritarianists held unwitting captive to the almighty
dollar and possessed of an inexplicably messianic
conviction that all the world’s people will be better
off once recruited into zombie servitude to corporate
overlords.
This is a gap not easily bridged. With blunt cudgel of human rights, Europe will only reinforce the
worst of US anxieties. Rather, I propose that the start
of an answer lies in the Fourth Amendment itself.
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If the minimal standard of tolerable intrusion into
a person’s life is guided by reasonableness—whether
the reasonable expectation of the individual, or the
reasonable suspicion of the state—perhaps it is that
same standard that can help Americans find their way
to a new norm of privacy.
Critics of the Fourth Amendment standard aptly
assert that the problem with reasonableness is its
malleability downward, that is, to a lowest common
denominator of tolerable conduct. But there is no
reason that reasonableness always must evolve downwardly. In tort law, reasonableness, as the keystone
of breach in negligence, has been well known to
evolve upwardly. Conduct that was once regarded as
comfortably within the purview of the “reasonable
man”—who in the 1920s apparently “[got] out of his
car at every railroad crossing to check for oncoming
trains”144—is now regarded as unexpected of the “reasonable person,” whose very name has adapted to new
norms.145 Is the beauty of the Fourth Amendment not
in the word “unreasonable”?146
The same concept might unlock a new future
for data protection in the private sector. The presently recent movement to piggyback negligence for
data protection offenses on sectoral privacy statutes
with no private cause of action is indicative of the
capacity of the common law to evolve and recognize civil wrongs in unprecedented circumstances.
Reasonableness lies at the heart of general negligence, and negligence per se permits, in most jurisdictions, the substitution of the statutory violation. In
an alternative formulation of negligence per se, the
statutory violation is at least admissible as persuasive
evidence for the finder of fact on the core question of breach. Either way, the common law seems
to have detected a sensible connection between
expectation in data protection law and standards of
reasonable conduct. In the same vein, 2014 saw the
adoption of a new common law tort in UK courts:
the misuse of private information.147 Seeming to lie
somewhere between conventional negligence and
breach of confidential duty,148 the nascent creature is
still taking shape. Just as the negligence theory in the
United States, the new British tort drew breath from
breach of data protection standards149—despite the
Brits’ famous hostility to aggressive federalism in the
European data protection system.150
Even in the contract/property paradigm, tort
law and civil rights play referee in private and public
26

July

2015

sector respectively. The duplication of tort norms in
civil rights, where private causes of action cannot
be denied upon a failure of legislative authorization,
demonstrates the common role. Tort steps in to
maintain a normative floor of social behavior where
contract and property law fail, as when a contract
or property transfer is procured by fraud, or a place
of employment is not maintained to a reasonable
standard of safety. The civil rights action provides the
same floor where the defendant acts under color of
law and violates a constitutional norm.151
It is premature for Europe to expect private
judicial redress for victims of data protection in the
United States, for any plaintiff, much less a European
plaintiff. But given a little more time, the patchwork
of US sectoral law, including the common law, might
get there itself. Forty-seven states have adopted data
breach notification laws, 14 with a private cause of
action.
Lest there be any doubt that our tort friend
reasonableness is up to the job of data protection,
“reasonable” or “reasonably” appears 47 times in the
CPBRA.

CONCLUSION
The EU and US data protection systems differ in important ways. The EU system is omnibus,
or comprehensive, and derives from the socialdemocratic tradition of European governance. The
US system is sectoral and accords with the libertarian tradition in US law and policy. For more than
a decade, these systems have co-existed with open
channels for data transfer under the Safe Harbor
Agreement and related model contractual clauses
and binding corporate rules. Now those open channels are threatened in a safe harbor renegotiation
necessitated by rapidly advancing technology, evolving social norms, and a legal system trying to keep up
with those changes.
The cultural gulf in privacy law and policy
between the United States and Europe will not be
bridged by a data protection agreement. In the long
term, the United States and Europe might move
naturally into harmonization. But in the short term, a
continuing accommodation is required, lest the continents’ differences impede technological, social, and
economic growth. To advance this understanding,
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this article highlighted three salient differences
between the US and EU law and policy.
First, the US state action doctrine drives a US
data protection system to be different from the EU
system, in which public and private sectors merge as
regulated entities. In this respect, Europe will have to
accept the public-private distinction in the United
States and embrace the dichotomy of negotiating
partners. In turn, the United States must be willing
to examine seriously, and to consider remediating,
the shortcomings of the Privacy Act and the Fourth
Amendment as regulations of public sector data
protection, just important as regulation of the commercial sector.
Second, US dual sovereignty drives an approach
to data protection different from the confederal
approach of the EU Data Protection Directive and
Proposed General Data Protection Regulation. It is
unrealistic at present for Europe to expect that federal data protection in the United States will reach
beyond the scope of interstate commerce. But if
afforded breathing room, the US states will in time
develop more advanced models for data protection.
In turn, the United States must be willing to consider
the civil rights implications of inadequate data protection in private and public sector, and to consider
how federal power may be used appropriately to avert
the construction of a surveillance state.
Third, the contract/property paradigm controls
the legal character of personal data in the United
States, while in Europe, a rights paradigm prevails.
These paradigms drive very different data protection
systems that arouse impassioned defenders on each
side. While this cultural gap will not be bridged easily or quickly, convergence over time is likely. Europe
is unlikely now to secure private legal redress for EU
citizens in the next iteration of safe harbor. But recent
developments in US law suggest that experimentation
with data protection statutes and tort law will move
the United States toward a more dynamic understanding of privacy. Corrective remedies for American and
Europeans alike might lie just over the horizon.
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